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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SAFARIS UNLIMITED, LLC, a Georgia 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross-appellant, 
v. 
MIKE VON JONES, 
Defendant/ Appellant/Cross-respondent. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 44914-2017 
Twin Falls County Case No. CV-2013-2706 
RESPONDENT I CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, 
in and for the County of Twin Falls 
Honorable Randy J. Stoker, District Judge, Presiding 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT/ 
CROSS-RESPONDENT 
Theodore R. Larsen (ISB #8193) 
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP 
P.O. Box 168 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT/ 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
David W. Gadd (ISB #7605) 
WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1428 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1428 
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I. ARGUMENT 
Jones's Reply Brief focuses on the issues presented by Safaris Unlimited's cross-appeal. 
Specifically, Jones argues that 1) given the evidence in the record, the trial court did not need to 
find the "specific value" of the Sligar Lawsuit in order to find that the consideration obtained by 
the sheriffs sale was grossly inadequate; 2) the fact that the Sligar Lawsuit is an unliquidated 
claim of Jones's and the possibility that its sale could cause him harm are sufficient "additional 
circumstances" to support the trial court's Order setting aside the sheriff's sale; 3) Idaho Code§ 
11-304 provides an additional basis upon which to affirm the trial court's Order; and 4) the trial 
court's Order to set the sheriff's sale aside is supported by the "sound public policy" that 
judgment creditors should not be allowed to execute on unliquidated claims. 
Many of these arguments have been addressed, in part, in Safaris Unlimited's revised 
brief, submitted previously to this Court. In this brief, Safaris Unlimited will further demonstrate 
why Jones's arguments are without merit. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT THE SLIGAR LAWSUIT HAD ANY 
VALUE. 
Jones contends that the trial court was not required to find the "specific value of the 
Sligar Lawsuit," which implies that Safaris Unlimited has argued to the contrary. This is 
incorrect. Safaris Unlimited has never argued that the trial court must make a finding of the 
Sligar Lawsuit's "specific value." But, at a minimum, the trial court must be able to finds that the 
asset has at least some value to it. Yet, in this case the trial court was unable to make that finding, 
stating, "It may be that Mr. Sliger owes Mr. Jones some money, it may be that Mr. Jones owes 
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Mr. Sliger some money, it may be that neither one of them owes anybody money. Who knows?" 
Tr Vol. II, p. 38, L. 25-p. 39, L. 3. 
The trial court's inability to determine whether the Sligar Lawsuit has any value may be 
due to several factors. For example, although Jones testified that he contributed in excess of 
$700,000 to the business and that he estimates that the joint assets are worth approximately 
$2,000,000, he further testified that his estimate does not take into account the return on his 
investments throughout the business relationship. R Vol. II, pp. 84-85. The record does not state 
the amounts that Jones received throughout the relationship as returns on his investments, but it 
is reasonable to conclude that Jones's share of the joint assets may be significantly less than 
$2,000,000, even if one only assumes a 50/50 relationship between Jones and Sligar/ Overtime 
Garage, LLC. See id. Moreover, Sligar and Overtime Garage, LLC have asserted a number of 
counterclaims against Jones, which may completely offset or even exceed the amount to which 
Jones is ultimately found to be entitled. Id. at pp. 53-63. The expense associated with litigating 
Jones's claims in the Sligar Lawsuit also reduces the value of that asset. 
The record and the transcript of the hearing do not reveal the extent of the trial court's 
consideration of these factors. However, as noted above, the trial court did expressly state that it 
was possible that Jones may be owed nothing on his claims and may even owe Sligar money. Tr 
Vol. II, p. 38, L. 25-p. 39, L. 3. Given the trial court's inability to find that the Sligar Lawsuit 
had any value, it could not reasonably conclude that Safaris Unlimited's bid was grossly 
inadequate. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion and erred in setting aside the 
sheriffs sale. 
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B. THE "ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE" REQUIRED TO SET A SHERIFF'S SALE 
ASIDE MUST RELATE TO THE SALE, NOT THE NATURE OF THE PROPERTY 
BEING SOLD. 
As Jones notes in his Brief, this Court recently stated, "Our decisions have uniformly 
held that there must be some irregularity in the sale or other slight additional circumstance [to set 
aside a sheriffs sale]." Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724,730,302 P.3d 349, 355 (2013). 
The issue before the Court in this case is what constitutes "other slight additional circumstance." 
As discussed in Safaris Unlimited's revised brief, nearly all of the cases reviewed and 
analyzed by the Phillips Court involve an irregularity with the conduct of the sheriffs sale. The 
only case discussed in which there was not an irregularity with the conduct of the sale itself is 
Tudor Engineering Co. v. Mouw, 109 Idaho 573, 709 P.2d 146 (1985), in which the additional 
circumstance was "the judgment [creditor's failure] to provide any of the interested parties with 
actual notice of the execution sale." Phillips, 154 Idaho at 729,302 P.3d at 354. Thus, all of the 
cases cited by Phillips in which this Court held that the sale should have been set aside involved 
circumstances related to the sale. Accordingly, when this Court stated in Phillips that there must 
be an "irregularity in the sale or other slight additional circumstance," it was referring to 
circumstances surrounding the sale. 
Jones nevertheless argues that any additional circumstance is sufficient, provided it 
results in some harm to the judgment debtor. In support of this argument, Jones references this 
Court's observation in Phillips that in each of the cases to date in which the sheriffs sale was 
properly set aside or should have been set aside, "the party injured by the grossly inadequate sale 
price and additional circumstance was the judgment debtor." Id. That statement, however, was 
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not a basis of this Court's holding in Phillips or otherwise treated as anything other than a mere 
observation. 
Rather, Phillips was decided on the grounds that a party's mistaken understanding of the 
law or failure to take adequate measures to protect her interests does not constitute an "additional 
circumstance." Id. at 730, 302 P.3d at 355. This Court did not limit that holding to cases where 
the judgment creditor was the party that made the mistake of law or failed to protect her interests, 
and there is no reason to believe that the result would have been any different if the mistaken 
party in that case had instead been the judgment debtor. 
As Phillips demonstrates, not all things deemed "additional circumstances" by a party are 
sufficient grounds to set aside a sheriffs sale. This is true even if those additional circumstances 
may cause harm to the judgment debtor. For example, a judgment debtor's mistaken belief that 
he was prohibited from attending the sheriffs sale or promoting the sale in order to potentially 
increase the price at which his property is sold would not be grounds to set the sale aside. The 
fact that the judgment debtor may be injured as a result of his mistaken understanding is 
immaterial. 
Jones's argument that the Sligar Lawsuit involves an unliquidated claim and, therefore, 
its sale creates the potential likelihood of harm to Jones is unpersuasive. The only potential harm 
that Jones may incur is that he will not receive the full value of the asset due to an inadequate 
purchase price. Thus, the argument that potential financial harm to Jones is an "additional 
circumstance" is simply another way of asserting that the winning bid was too low. "This Court 
has not previously held that gross inadequacy of price, standing alone, provides grounds for 
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setting aside a sheriffs sale. Our decisions have uniformly held that there must be some 
irregularity in the sale or other slight additional circumstance." Id. Therefore, the financial harm 
that Jones asserts he may incur does not provide an "additional circumstance" necessary to grant 
relief from the sheriffs sale. 
C. IDAHO CODE § 11-304 HAS NO BEARING ON THIS CASE. 
Jones makes passing reference to Idaho Code§ 11-304 in support of his contention that 
the unliquidated nature of the Sligar Lawsuit provides the additional circumstance required to set 
the sale aside. Jones appears to base his argument in this regard on the second sentence of that 
section, which states, "After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution, no more 
can be sold." Idaho Code§ 11-304. This sentence applies to situations where a sheriff has levied 
upon multiple items of property, rather than a single item. If the sale of some of those items 
results in proceeds sufficient to satisfy the judgment, then the sheriff is required to discontinue 
the sale of the remaining items. Where there is only a single item of property to be sold, 
however, the requirement is inapplicable. Therefore, Jones's reliance on section 11-304 is 
entirely misplaced. 
D. JONES'S PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE 
LEGISLATURE, AS THEY ADDRESS WHETHER THE SLIGAR LAWSUIT 
SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION, NOT WHETHER THE SHERIFF'S 
SALE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE. 
Jones spends significant time in his brief setting forth what he describes as "sound public 
policy" that supports the trial court's decision "to deny the sale of unliquidated litigation via 
public auction." Appellant's Reply Br., p. 6. The use of the term "deny the sale" is revealing, as 
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it shows that Jones's argument, at its core, is not that there were additional circumstances that 
justified setting aside the sale but rather that the asset should not have been sold at all. Stated 
differently, Jones's argument is that unliquidated claims should be exempt from execution. 
Jones's contention in that regard is better directed toward the Idaho Legislature, as it falls 
under the Legislature's purview to determine what property is exempt from execution. The Idaho 
Legislature has determined that all nonexempt property of a judgment debtor is liable to 
execution. Idaho Code§ 11-201. Furthermore, "It is well recognized that a debtor's right to 
exempt property from the claims of creditors is not a common law right but is dependent upon 
constitutional or statutory allowance. Thus, the general rule is that assets are not exempt from the 
claims of creditors unless specifically exempted by statute." Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945, 
950, 908 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations omitted). 
There is no exemption available to Jones relative to the Sligar Lawsuit under Idaho Code, 
and Jones has not asserted any such exemption exists. Rather, Jones is asking this Court to create 
an exemption not provided for by statute, which, with due respect to this Court, would require it 
to exercise powers that it does not have. As this Court has noted, 
While the statute should be liberally construed, it has been held that construction 
should not be indulged in to the extent of conferring privileges and benefits by 
construction which were not intended to be conferred by the Legislature, or to the 
extent of doing violence to the terms of the statute. 
Youngv. Wright, 77 Idaho 244,246,290 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1955) (quoting Conlin v. Traeger, 
258 P. 433,434 (Cal. 1927). 
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Safaris Unlimited rejects Jones's contention that "sound public policy" requires the 
recognition of an exemption for unliquidated claims. In any event, however, the validity of those 
arguments is a decision for the Idaho Legislature to make, not this Court. At this time, the Idaho 
Legislature has not created an exemption or any other special status for a judgment debtor's 
unliquidated claims. Thus, under Idaho law, the Sligar Lawsuit is not exempt, and the sheriffs 
sale should be allowed to stand. 
IL CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth, above, and in its prior brief, Safaris Unlimited respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse and vacate the trial court's Order Granting Motion to Set Aside 
Sheriff's Sale. Additionally, Safaris Unlimited requests that this Court affirm the Judgment 
entered by the trial court and award Safaris Unlimited its attorney's fees incurred in connection 
with this appeal. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018. 
WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, PLLC 
By: ~ (lc;t?[") 
David W. Gadd 
Attorneys for Safaris Unlimited, LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of January, 2018, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT I CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served 
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Theodore R. Larsen 
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, 
LLP P.O. Box 168 
Jerome, ID 83338 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/ 
Cross-respondent 
C8J U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: (208) 324-3135 
C8J Electronic Mail: trlarsen@wmlattys.com 
David W. Gadd 
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